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Comments and Casenotes
Civilian Dependents And Employees At Overseas
'Bases Not 'Subject To Court Martial Jurisdiction
Kinsella v. United States'
McElroy v. United States2
Grisham v. Hagan3
The instant cases involve an expansion of the princi-
ple enunciated earlier in the companion, cases of Reid v.
Covert4 and Kinsella v. Krueger.5 In those cases, the
Supreme Court held that civilian dependents of service-
men stationed at overseas bases could not constitutionally
be tried by courts-martial for capital offenses committed
while overseas during peacetime. The majority of the
Court in the Covert case intimated, however, that this
should apply to any offense, regardless of its gravity. Mr.
Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Harlan, in separate
concurring opinions, restricted their concurrences to the
facts of the Covert case, namely capital offenses. Mr.
Justice Clark and Mr. Justice Burton dissented. Because
of those divergent viewpoints, and the factor of a possible
shift in the balance of the Court due to the non-participa-
tion of Mr. Justice Whittaker in the Covert case, and the
anticipated retirement of Mr. Justice Burton, there was
some doubt as to how the court would treat extensions of
court-martial jurisdiction to civilian dependents accom-
panying the armed forces overseas in cases involving
noncapital offenses, or to civilian employees serving with
the armed forces overseas.
The instant three cases, decided by opinions handed
down on the same day, resolve these open questions.
In the Kinsella case,6 the defendant, wife of a member of
the United States Army stationed in Germany, was con-
victed in Germany by a court-martial of the noncapital
offense of involuntary manslaughter of her one year old
son. The jurisdiction of the court-martial was based on
Article 2 (11) of the Uniform Code of Military JusticeJ
1361 U.S. 234 (190).
p361 U.S. 281 (1960).
a 361 U.S. 278 (1960).
4354 U.S. 1 (1957), noted 17 Md. L. Rev. 335 (1957).
Ibid.
6 Supra, n. 1.
710 U.S.C.A. § 802 (11), which reads: "The following persons are
subject to this chapter:
'(11) Subject to any treaty or agreement to which the United States
Is or may be a party or to any accepted rule of international law,
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in conjunction with the NATO Status of Forces Agree-
ment.8 The United States Court of Military Appeals upheld
the conviction, and the defendant was returned to the
United States to serve her sentence in the Federal Re-
formatory for Women. Petitioner, the mother of the de-
fendant, contending that her daughter was deprived of the
safeguards of Article III and the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ments to the Constitution, secured her discharge from
custody by a petition for habeas corpus filed with the
United States District Court for the Southern District of
West Virginia.' The Government appealed to the Supreme
Court, which, in affirming the action of the District Court,
held that the defendant as the wife of a soldier stationed
overseas was not amenable to prosecution by a court-
martial for a noncapital offense committed while overseas
during peacetime.
In the McElroy case,"° the Court held that two civilian
employees of overseas military forces were not amenable
to prosecution, by courts-martial for noncapital offenses.
In the Grisham case," the Court held, a fortiori, that a
civilian employee of an overseas military force was not
amenable to prosecution by a court-martial for a capital
offense.
Mr. Justice Clark, speaking for the majority in the
instant cases analyzed them in two aspects: (1) in terms
of Article I, section 8, clause 14 of the Constitution which
gives Congress the power "to make Rules for the Govern-
ment and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;" and
(2) in terms of the "Necessary and Proper" Clause.' 2
As to Article I, section 8, clause 14, the Court said the
question is one of status, rather than one of offense, and
consequently, civilian dependents and employees cannot be
considered as falling within the term "land and naval
persons serving with, employed by, or accompanying the armed forces
outside the United States and outside the following: that part of
Alaska east of longitude 172 degrees west, the Canal Zone, the main
group of the Hawaiian Islands, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.' "
8 63 STAT. 2241 (1949); 4 UNITED STATES TREATIES AND OTHER INTER-
NATIONAL AGREEMENTS (hereinafter cited T.I.A.S.) (1953), pt. 2, 1794.
, 164 F. Supp. 707 (S.D. W. Va. 1958).
10 Supra, n. 2. The decision involved two separate cases. In one, a
civilian electrical lineman, employed by the Air Force, was convicted by
a court-martial near Casablanca, Morocco, of larceny and conspiracy to
commit larceny of government property. In the other, a civilian auditor,
employed by the Army and stationed In Berlin, was convicted by a court-
martial of sodomy.
n Supra, n. 3. Petitioner, a civilian employee of the United States Army
in France, was tried by a court-martial for the capital offense of unpre-
meditated murder.
"Art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
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Forces."'" The Court alluded to the recognized textual
authority on court-martial jurisdiction, 4 which was later
quoted from in the McElroy case:
"That a civilian, entitled as he is, by Art. VI of the
Amendments to the Constitution, to trial by jury, can-
not be made liable to the military law and, jurisdiction,
in time of peace, is a fundamental principle of our
public law .... -"I
In fortification of the status approach, the Court dis-
cussed, the landmark case of United States ex. rel.
Toth v. Quarles," in which it was held that a soldier who
had committed an offense while in the service could not be
tried by a court-martial for this offense after his discharge
from such service. In the instant case, the language of the
Toth case was applied, namely, "... the power granted
Congress 'to make Rules' to regulate 'the land and naval
Forces' would seem to restrict court-martial jurisdiction, to
persons who are actually members or part of the armed,
forces.' 7 In the McElroy case, the Court said, "... as to all
civilians serving with the armed forces today, we believe
the Toth doctrine,.. . that we must limit the coverage of
Clause 14 to 'the least possible power adequate to the end
proposed,'... to be controlling."' 8
As to the effect of the "Necessary and Proper" Clause,"
the Court stressed the propriety of limiting Article I, sec-
tion 8, clause 14 by use of the "Necessary and Proper"
Clause, rather than expanding clause 14, as the Govern-
ment strongly urged. The Court, in echoing James
Madison, said:
"That clause fNecessary and Proper Clausel is not it-
self a grant of power, but a caveat that the Congress
possesses all of the means necessary to carry out the
specifically granted 'foregoing' powers of sec. 8 'and
all other Powers vested by this Constitution'."20
Then the Court rationalized by saying that as the "Neces-
sary and Proper" Clause did not expand clause 14 in the
Covert case, it cannot expand it to include prosecution of
u Art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
1 4 WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND -PREUoMNTS (2d ed. 1896).
" Ibid., 143, cited in McElroy v. United States, supra, n. 2, 284.
350 U.S. 11 (195), noted, 16 Md. L. Rev. 143 (1956).
Ibid., 15.
Supra, n. 2, 286.
Art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
'361 U.S. 234, 247 (190).
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civilian dependents for noncapital offenses. This idea was
followed in the McElroy and Grisham cases.
Mr. Justice Harlan, joined by Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
dissented in the Kinsella case and in the McElroy case,
but concurred in the Grisham case. He attacked the
status rationale of the majority, and emphasized that the
distinction, between capital and noncapital offenses should
be maintained, in view of the awesomeness of the death
penalty. In addition, he urged that the "Necessary and
Proper" Clause should be applicable to allow the military
to subject these noncapital offenders to court-martial juris-
diction.
Mr. Justice Whittaker, joined by Mr. Justice Stewart,
concurred in the Kinsella case, but dissented in the
McElroy and Grisham cases. He would draw no distinction
between capital and noncapital offenses committed by
civilian dependents, but he felt that the distinction between
civilian dependents and civilian employees should be the
criterion. This reasoning would subject all civilian em-
ployees to court-martial jurisdiction, regardless of the
gravity of the offense.
This series of cases completes the orbit of adjudication
in this area of court-martial jurisdiction over civilians
accompanying or serving with the armed forces overseas in
peacetime. Any previous doubts 'have been resolved in
clear cut fashion. Now, no civilian, whether dependent
or employee, accompanying or serving with the armed
forces overseas in peacetime, may be deprived of his
constitutional right to trial by jury by being subjected to
trial by court-martial.
The conclusiveness of the instant cases is far less awe-
some than the problems which they create. The immediate
reaction to these decisions is that unless Congress can
operate quickly, perpetrators of these offenses will con
tinue to go unpunished. Senator Hennings, Chairman, of
the Senate Constitutional Rights Subcommittee, has in-
dicated several solutions:
"The United States has several alternatives: (1)
Let foreign countries try these American civilians the
way they would try any other American civilians
under their local laws in their own courts; (2) bring
the civilians back for trial in courts in the United
States; (3) enact legislation placing such civilians in
a military status so they could be covered, by courts-
martial under the Uniform Code of Military Justice."'"
'Oongressional Record, vol. 106, no. 8, 646, January 19, 1960.
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The Court in the instant cases suggested various alter-
natives in dealing with these civilians. Of those alterna-
tives, the following appear to be the most feasible:22
First. Congress might provide for the replacement of
civilian employees by servicemen currently in the spe-
cialist program of the Department of the Army.23 This has
some merit, but has the obvious obstacle of shortage of
manpower. It is conceivable, however, that these spe-
cialists could be used to fill at least a portion of the over-
seas jobs. Of course, such an alternative could, not include
civilian dependents.
Second. Congress might grant greater concessions to
foreign governments to try these American, civilians than
those provided for in the existing Status of Forces Agree-
ment.2 4 This is an undesirable approach from the stand-
point of morale and international relations, and the great
diversity among foreign judicial systems would un-
doubtedly produce conflicting standards of fairness. How-
ever, due to the vast difficulties in bringing civilians back
to the United States for trial, greater resort to prosecution
by foreign countries might be feasible.2 5
Third. Congress might provide for the prosecution of
these civilians in Federal District Courts in the United
States. This appears to be a sound approach, although
admittedly not devoid of complications. For one thing,
foreign witnesses cannot be subpoenaed by the federal
courts. There would also be much interference with ser-
vice duties if military witnesses were shuttled back and
forth. There is a possible conflict with the Sixth Amend-
ment which commands that a trial shall take place in
"the State and district" where the crime was committed.26
In addition, the apparent expense in transporting the neces-
2 The other alternatives suggested by the Court were: the Institution of
a procedure similar to that used by the Navy in regard to paymasters'
clerks, who served aboard ship and whose trials were sanctioned in
Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13 (1879) and Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U.S. 109
(1895) ; the compulsory induction or voluntary enlistment Into the armed
forces of those civilian employees slated for overseas positions; the
voluntary enlistment of specialists similar to the procedure used with the
Seabees during World War II.
1 See Army Regulation 600-201, 20 June 1956, as changed 15 March 1957,
and Army Regulation 624-200, 19 May 1958, as changed 1 July 1959.
2163 STAT. 2241 (1949) ; 4 T.I.A.S. (1953), pt. 2, 1794.
2 The Court did not list this explicitly, but It may be inferred from the
opinion.
1 However, Cook v. United States, 138 U.S. 157, 181-183 (1891) Indi-
cates that the sixth amendment has reference only to crimes committed
within a state; see also United States v. Dawson, 15 How. 467, 487 (U.S.
1853).
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sary persons back and forth might be imposing. These are
only a few of the many obstacles."
It is beyond the scope of this note to discuss detailed
proposals for such legislation, but this writer believes that
suitable legislation should incorporate three broad ideas:
First. Congress should provide for the prosecution, of
these civilian dependents and employees in Federal Dis-
trict Courts sitting in the United States, accepting the
Court's earlier construction that Article III, Section, 2 of
the Constitution empowers Congress to provide for the
place of trial for federal crimes occurring outside the
boundaries of the States, and restricting the Sixth Amend-
ment's application to federal crimes committed within a
State.2" A special federal court could be created with con-
current subject matter jurisdiction with courts-martial
of violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, or
the existing federal courts could be used, provided they
were granted this concurrent jurisdiction. If the latter is
adopted, the individual should be brought back to the
United States and tried in the federal district in which the
home port of his overseas unit is located. This would
produce uniformity, leave little doubt as to venue, and
facilitate the knotty problem of arranging for overseas
witnesses. As to the establishment of roving Article III
courts in foreign lands, it is extremely doubtful that any
foreign country would acquiesce in such a proposal.29
Second. Congress should implement the above sug-
gested legislation with a provision for a waiver of jury
trial, whereby a civilian accused of a crime could waive
his constitutional right to be tried in an Article III court
and thus voluntarily submit himself to court-martial juris-
diction.30 In criminal cases a defendant may waive a jury
trial, so by analogy it would seem that he could waive his
federal prosecution in the United States, assuming Con-
gress authorized such prosecution: "As a practical mat-
ter, then, it seems that anyone overseas could, with the
27 EvERETT, MrILITARY .TUSTICE IN THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED
STATES (1st ed. 1956), Ch. III; for an exhaustive discussion, see Comment.
Criminal Jurisdiction Over Civilians Accompanying American Armed Forces
Overseas, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 712 (1958).
2 Supra. n. 26: and see 71 Harv. L. Rev.. ibid., 723.
21 See Comment, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Civilians Accompanying
American Armed Forces Overseas, sutpra, n. 27.
so This waiver would also extend to ,the constitutional guarantee of in-
dictment by grand jury. See Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann,
317 U.S. 269 (1942); P atton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930)
Barkman v. Sanford, 162 F. 2d 592 (5th Cir. 1947), cert. den. 332 U.S.
816 (1947) ; see also 71 Harv. L. Rev. 712 (1958) ; 107 U. of 'Pa. L. Rev. 270
(1958) ; 27 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 245 (1958).
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cooperation of military authorities, subject himself to
their jurisdiction."' This might appeal to the individual in
many cases because of a desire to maintain anonymity,
the impractibility of retaining suitable counsel in the
United States, or the firm belief that the military court
will be more lenient than the federal court. There appears
to be nothing in the instant cases which would prohibit
the use of such a waiver provision.
Third. Congress should amend the jurisdictional pro-
visions of the Status of Forces Agreement to allow the
foreign countries greater primary concurrent jurisdiction
than they have at present under the treaty.2 At the same
time, there should be instituted a policy which would
limit the number of demands made by the United States
upon foreign countries to turn over American civilians
held by foreign courts for violations of foreign law. Such a
policy would allow cases with very serious charges to be
sent to the United States, but for expediency would allow
the less serious cases to be tried in foreign courts, as they
would be if no Status of Forces Agreement existed.
Mr. Justice Clark, who criticized the majority in the
Covert"8 case for failing to provide any authoritative
guidance as to what Congress might do by way of legis-
lation, has supplied much of this needed guidance in the
m EvERET, MIITARY JUSTICE IN THE ARMED FORCES Or THE UNITED
STATES (1st ed. 1956), Ch. III, 24.
12Ibid., 41. Everett has summed up Article VII of the Status of Forces
Agreement, which deals with jurisdiction, in this manner:
"Under the Status of Forces Treaty, the United States reserves
exclusive jurisdiction over persons subject to its military law with
respect to offenses punishable under that law, but not under the
law of the host country where the offense is committed. Conversely,
as to crimes punishable under the law of the host country, but not
under American law, that country reserves exclusive jurisdiction.
This jurisdiction embraces American military personnel, their depend-
ents, and civilians 'accompanying' an American armed force 'who are
in 'the employ of an Armed Service of' the United States. . . . It is
clear, however, that the most typical case will be one where the
offense committed would be punishable under both American law and
the foreign law concerned. Here there is concurrent jurisdiction.
One nation, nevertheless, is considered to have primary jurisdiction;
the other, only secondary jurisdiction. The United States would
have primary jurisdiction of an offense solely against the security or
property of the United States, or against the person or property of
American personnel, as well as of offenses arising out of actions 'in
the performance of official duty.' In other instances of concurrent
jurisdiction, the host country has the primary right to exercise
jurisdiction. It is agreed, however, that that country will give
'sympathetic consideration' to any request by the United States for
waiver of jurisdiction If the United States thinks such waiver 'to
be of particular importance.'"
-354 U.S. 1 (1957), noted 17 Md. L. Rev. 335 (1957).
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instant cases. The burden is now upon Congress . 4 By
effecting the three ideas of federal prosecutions in the
United States, waiver of jury trial, and revampment of
the jurisdictional provisions of the Status of Forces Agree-
ment, the constitutional rights of the individual will be
adequately safeguarded, and our relations with foreign
countries should not be any more strained than they are
at present.
FRANK J. VECELLA
Health Inspections Of Private Homes
Frank v. Maryland'
Because of a large quantity of debris and rat droppings
outside Frank's decaying house, a Baltimore health in-
spector searching for the source of a neighborhood rat
infestation demanded to examine Frank's basement. Frank
refused to admit the inspector until he obtained a search
warrant. Subsequently Frank was tried and convicted be-
fore a Police Justice for violating Article 12, Section 120,
of the Baltimore City Code, which imposes a fine on any
homeowner who refuses to admit a health inspector having
reason to suspect a nuisance exists in the house. Failing
to gain acquittal on appeal to the Criminal Court of Bal-
timore and certiorari being denied, by the Maryland Court
of Appeals, Frank appealed his case to the Supreme Court.
Since Wolf v. Colorado3 settled that the prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures afforded by the Fourth
Amendment4 to the Constitution of the United States ex-
",Senator Keating, on January 19, 1960, Introduced Senate Resolution
235, which proposed a select committee to investigate and recommend
new legislation in this area relating to the jurisdiction of federal courts
over civilians employed by or accompanying our armed forces overseas. At
this writing, the resolution is in the hands of the Committee on the
Judiciary.
1359 U.S. 360 (1959).
2 (Flack, 1950) :
"Whenever the Commissioner of Health shall have cause to suspect
that a nuisance exists in any house, cellar or enclosure, he may
demand entry therein in the day time, and if 'the owner or occupier
shall refuse or delay to open the same and admit a free examination,
he shall forfeit and pay for every such refusal the sum of Twenty
Dollars."
'338 U.S. 25 (1949), noted 38 Calif. L. Rev. 498 (1950).
' "The right of the People to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the person or things to be seized."
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